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Naturalism as a Joyful Science: 








In this essay I explore naturalism as a joyful science by focusing on how Nietzsche and 
Deleuze appropriate an Epicurean legacy.  In the first section I introduce some salient 
features of Epicurean naturalism and highlight how the study of nature is to guide ethical 
reflection on the art of living.  In the next section I focus on Nietzsche and show the 
nature and extent of his Epicurean commitments in his middle period writings.  In the 
third and final main section my attention shifts to Deleuze and to showing how he 
fruitfully demonstrates the intersection of physics and ethics in the Epicurean method of 
thinking.  I am interested in Epicureanism since, as both Nietzsche and Deleuze show, it 
holds ethics to be central to philosophical inquiry and activity: we don’t simply study 
nature as end in itself but as a way of better understanding how we can promote a 
flourishing life.  Our being in the world is not to be guided by myths and illusions, 
especially of a supernatural kind, but rather by the affirmation of the positive power of an 
immanent and multiple nature and by the joy that results from recognising the diversity of 




Natural history, as the history of the wars and victories of moral-spiritual force in 
opposition to fear, imagination, indolence, superstition, folly, should be narrated 
in such a way that everyone who hears it would be irresistibly impelled to strive 
for spiritual-physical health and maturity, to feel gladness at being the heir and 




This citation is a significant one since it brings into relief in a highly instructive manner 
Nietzsche’s two main concerns once his thought has started to mature circa 1878-80 and 
take on its enlightened shape, namely, on the one hand, his commitment to naturalism – 
to be pursued through the study of natural history – and, on the other hand, the concern 
with philosophical therapeutics.  It is interesting to reflect on the fact that Nietzsche 
conceives natural history ‘as the history of the wars and victories of moral-spiritual 
force’, and he is clearly stating his naturalist-minded agenda when he refers to the need to 
combat ‘fear, imagination, indolence, superstition, and folly’.  In this essay I want to 
highlight some of the key features of Nietzsche’s attachment to naturalism and his 
conception of its ends.   Gilles Deleuze argues that as a project naturalism has both a 
speculative or theoretical dimension and a practical one, in which the goal of the project 
is the production of pleasure and the defeat of sadness, and where sadness equals the 
diminution of our power of action.   In what follows I shall clarify the sense of this 
pleasure and the nature of the defeat, and also show the extent to which Nietzsche 
conforms to this conception of philosophy. He does so in the context of adapting ancient 
naturalism to specifically modern conditions of existence.  This is what he is developing 
in his middle period writings as the project of ‘the joyful science’.  
It is arguable that Democritean and Epicurean naturalism are the first philosophies 
to radically de-deify nature, which serves as an inspiration for Nietzsche from his earliest 
writings: he calls Democritus the freest human being (KSA 7, 23 [17]). More than this 
de-deification of nature Nietzsche in inspired in his middle period by the Epicurean 
garden practice of philosophy.  We know he had plans to create his own garden in the 
style of Epicurus and it deeply influences his conception of philosophical practice.2  In 
what follows I first explicate some key aspects of Epicurean teaching. I then examine the 
reception of Epicurus we encounter in Nietzsche and centred on his middle period 
writings. In the third and final section my attention moves to Deleuze’s reading of 
Epicurean naturalism, which is focused on Lucretius.  
 
Epicurean Teaching and the Epicurean Attachment to Life 
 
 
The teaching of Epicurus is centred on the study of nature, and this is its first and most 
fundamental principle.  But Epicurus does not restrict himself to being a philosopher-
scientist simply producing a doctrine of physics.  Rather, he wishes to be a teacher, and to 
this end he produced a summary of his system so as ‘to facilitate the firm memorization 
of the most general doctrines, in order that at each and every opportunity they may be 
able to help themselves on the most important issues, to the degree that they retain their 
grasp on the study of nature’.3  As Foucault shows, Epicurus has an ‘ethopoetic’ 
appreciation of knowledge, which is a mode of knowledge that provides ethos. In the 
Epicurean texts knowledge of nature is called phusiologia, which is a ‘modality of 
knowledge (savoir) of nature insofar as it is philosophically relevant for the practice of 
the self’ (see Epicurus, Vatican Sayings 45).4   Epicurus opposes knowledge as paideia, 
which is a cultural learning that aims at glory and is little more than a kind of boastful 
knowledge.   Foucault notes that Epicurus rejects this mode of knowledge as a culture of 
boasters, one mainly developed by concocters of words that seek admiration from the 
masses.  The knowledge Epicurus promotes is one that prepares the self for the events of 
a life.  Foucault explains: 
 
…what does phusiologia do instead of producing people who are only pompous 
and inconsistent boasters?  It paraskeuei, that is to say it prepares…Paraskeue is 
the equipping, the preparation of the subject and the soul so that they will be 
properly, necessarily, and sufficiently armed for whatever circumstance of life 
may arise…it is the exact opposite of paideia.5 
 
The knowledge that is phusiologia serves to provide the individual with boldness 
and courage, what Foucault calls a kind of intrepidity, a preparedness that enables the 
individual to stand firm not only against the (many) beliefs that others seek to impose on 
him, but also against the hazards of life and the authority of those who wish to lay down 
the law: ‘Absence of fear, a sort of recalcitrance and spiritedness if you like: this is what 
phusiologia gives to the individuals who learn it’.6  This means that, strictly speaking, 
phusiologia is not a branch of knowledge (savoir), but rather a knowledge (connaissance) 
of nature, of phusis, to the extent that this knowledge serves as a principle of human 
conduct and as the criterion for setting individuals free.7  The aim of this knowledge of 
nature is to transform the subject, one that is originally filled with fear and terror before 
nature to one that is a free subject able to find within itself, ‘the possibility and means of 
his permanent and perfectly tranquil delight’.8  
For Epicurus, then, the mind has a tendency to live in fear of nature, and is easily 
led astray by religious teaching that tempt the person to embrace metaphysical-moral 
doctrines, that is, doctrines, that fail to appreciate that there is a natural causal order and 
that we, as human beings, are fully implicated in it.  On Epicurean teaching the natural 
world is an order of things devoid of design, agency, intention, and revelatory signs. For 
Epicurus, what is needed for the popularization of philosophy are ‘simple principles and 
maxims’, ones that can aid the mind to readily assimilate, when occasions necessitate, the 
core doctrines derived from the study of nature:  ‘…it is not possible’, he writes, ‘to know 
the concentrated result of our continuous overview of the universe unless one can have in 
oneself a comprehensive grasp by means of brief maxims of all that might also be worked 
out in detail with precision’.9  Epicurus states clearly the aim of the exercise: it is to bring 
calm to one’s life, in which one has a mind that is all too quickly agitated by our being in 
the world and the things that afflict us.  We need, then, to observe things in accordance 
with our sense perceptions and in accordance with our actual feelings, and ‘so that we can 
have some sign by which we make inferences both about what awaits confirmation and 
about the non-evident’.10  
From these basic philosophical principles Epicurus builds up a sophisticated 
system of nature, indeed a philosophy of nature that is highly novel and far-reaching, 
anticipating much modern scientific thought. For example, he wants us to appreciate the 
following key insights and then to adopt them as part of a practice of wisdom:  (a) first, 
nothing comes into being from what is not for if it did ‘everything would come into being 
from everything, with no need of seeds’; (b) second, when something disappears it is not 
destroyed into nothing since if it was all things would have been destroyed, ‘since that 
into which they were dissolved does not exist’; (c) third, the totality of what exists has 
always been just like it is now at present and like it will always be simply because there is 
nothing else than what there is, that is, nothing for it to change into: ‘…there exists 
nothing in addition to the totality, which could enter into it and produce the change’.11  
The totality of which he speaks is made up of bodies and void. Our sense perception, he 
argues, testifies to the former, and it is through sense perception that we infer by 
reasoning what is not evident, namely, the void: if this did not exist (space and intangible 
nature) then bodies would be devoid of a place to be in and to move through, and it is 
obvious that they do move.  The principles of bodies are atomic in nature, and here we 
refer to the composition of bodies, in which some exist as compounds and some as things 
from which the compounds are made.  The elements out of which things are made are 
‘atomic and unchangeable’ in that they are not destroyed into non-being but remain 
‘firmly during the dissolution of compounds, being full by nature and not being subject to 
dissolution in any way or fashion’.12    
For Epicurus philosophical thinking on the nature of things proves vital to the 
health of one’s soul, and one is never too young or too old for its activity.  Even when he 
is outlining the details of his physics, as in the letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, 
Epicurus never tires of drawing attention to the blessedness that comes from knowledge, 
by which he means knowledge of nature, including meteorological phenomena.  The task 
is to strip the workings of the natural world of the activity of the gods and to free it of 
agency and teleology.  This is an aspect of the teaching that impresses itself upon 
Nietzsche as when he calls for the de-deification of nature and the naturalization of 
humanity (GS 109), as well as, on a more practical and mundane level, the need to avoid 
the danger of ‘spiritual unfreedom’ in the face of the ‘beautiful chaos of existence’: this 
takes place when we allow in through the back door, and in our interpretation of the 
things that happen to us in a life, providential design and goodness.  In interpreting the 
fortunes that strike one in life, and bestowing a significance on them, the danger is that 
we will allow back into our lives the intentions or designs of the gods, be it some kind of 
petty deity who has our best interests at heart or even, says Nietzsche, the gods of 
Epicurus (the ones that are most indifferent to our existence). The solution Nietzsche 
proposes to our predicament is in accordance with the teaching of Epicurus: to leave the 
gods in peace and ‘rest content with the supposition that our own practical and theoretical 
skill in interpreting and arranging events has now reached a high point’ (GS 277). In 
addition, we can acknowledge that good old chance sometimes plays with us: ‘now and 
then chance guides our hand, and the wisest providence could not think up a more 
beautiful music than that which our foolish hand produces then’ (ibid.). 
In the Epicurean teaching natural phenomena admit of a plurality of explanations, 
but in spite of this plurality – say with respect to explaining lightning, thunder, the 
formation of clouds, the waning and waxing of the moon, the variations of the length of 
nights and days, and so on – the task is to ascertain natural causes and in this respect 
knowledge of celestial phenomena has no other end ‘than peace of mind and firm 
conviction’ (see letter to Pythocles).  Epicurus states clearly and emphatically:   
 
For in the study of nature we must not conform to empty assumptions and 
arbitrary laws, but follow the promptings of the facts; for our life has no need now 
of unreason and false opinion; our one need is untroubled existence.13 
  
The enjoyment of life assumes a distinctive character in Epicurus. In the letter to 
Menoeceus, Epicurus seeks to identify what the study of philosophy can do for the health 
of the soul and on the premise that, “pleasure is the starting-point and goal of living 
blessedly.”14 Epicurus stresses that he does not mean the pleasures of the profligate or of 
consumption; rather, the task, is to become accustomed to simple, non-extravagant ways 
of living.  Although Epicurus regards voluptas as the highest good, in which we can take 
delight in all that nature has provided to stimulate pleasure, it is an error to suppose that 
for him happiness is to be found “simply in eating, drinking, gambling, wenching, and 
other such pastimes.” 15  Nietzsche seems to have fully appreciated this point: ‘A tiny 
garden, figs, a bit of cheese, and three or four friends besides – this was luxuriance for 
Epicurus’ (WS 192).  
At the centre of Epicurean teaching is a distinction between kinetic pleasure and 
katestematic pleasure and that works as follows: ‘kinetic’ pleasure is basic instinctive 
pleasure produced by action to satisfy a need, such as the ingestion of food.  This is an 
unstable kind of pleasure since it is temporary and involves pain – the pleasure of eating 
will soon be followed by the pain of hunger, etc.; ‘katastematic’ pleasure is stable in that 
it endures and involves no pain:  it is the pleasure of serenity, involving the absence of 
need and desire, and psychic equilibrium. It is superior to the animal pursuits of food and 
sex and for the Epicureans is to be elevated into the highest goal of life, attaining the state 
of ataraxia. As Gisela Striker puts it, Epicurus was perhaps the first philosopher who 
sought to bring this mental state into the framework of a eudaemonist theory and by 
arguing that it is a special sort of pleasure.16 It is to be reached by true insight and 
reasoning.  James Porter argues that pleasure is not simply bound up with moral 
hedonism but also with an epistemology: ‘as a criterion of truth, as one of the pathê by 
which we feel our way through the world’.17  In contrast to pain, which causes us to 
shrink back from the world, pleasure draws us to it: it is both congenital and congenial.18 
The Epicurean state of mind (ataraxy) is best described as one of stable (katastematic) 
pleasure, and, furthermore, as the basal experience of pleasure on account of it being the 
criterion of all pleasure.  In this sense, then, it is more than a condition of simple or mere 
happiness: ‘it seems to operate as life’s internal formal principle, as that which gives 
moral sense and shape to a life that is lived...’ 19   
The key goal for Epicurus is to liberate the body from pain and remove 
disturbances from the soul. Central to his counsel is the thought that we need to accustom 
ourselves to believing that death is nothing to us; our longing for immortality needs to be 
removed: “…there is nothing fearful in life for one who has grasped that there is nothing 
fearful in the absence of life.”20 What appears to be the most frightening of bad things 
should be nothing to us, “since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is 
present, then we do not exist.”21 The wise human being “neither rejects life nor fears 
death. For living does not offend him, nor does he believe not living to be something 
bad.”22  If, as Epicurus supposes, everything good and bad consists in sense-experience, 
then death is simply the privation of sense-experience.  The goal of philosophical 
training, then, is freedom from disturbance and anxiety in which we reach a state of 
psychic tranquillity (ataraxia): the body is free from pain and the soul is liberated from 
distress.   
Several commentators note that the Greek word hedone could just as well be 
translated as delight or joy, denoting the sweetness of life and not simple-minded 
sensualist gratification.23 But is Epicureanism a philosophy of life-affirmation, or does it 
simply depict a universe of atoms and the void that is indifferent to life?  As James Porter 
notes, life has no intrinsic value for Epicurus, but does this mean that life is an indifferent 
for him?24  When viewed from a third-person point of view, that is, the cosmological one 
(of atoms and the void), then life has no claim on us; rather, it discloses to us that, “we 
are nothing more than physical entities, mere fortuitous combinations of matter which 
reduce to their elements upon disbanding.”25  From the viewpoint of nature, then, life is 
an indifferent.  The matter changes, however, when we view things from a first-person 
perspective on life, that is, the world of sensations, desires, and needs, or of nature in its 
human aspect. Here we find that life by definition is not indifferent but a meaningful 
source of value. As Porter puts it, the issue facing the Epicurean philosopher “is to decide 
just what this value is and where it lies.”26  The argument is that life is a source of human 
pleasure and thus of moral happiness, involving a strong attachment. Porter argues that 
once we connect pleasure to life it is possible to show that Epicurus has a philosophy of 
life in addition to a philosophy of death and that, in fact, it is this emphasis on life and not 




 Nietzsche and Epicurean Naturalism 
 
 
If, as Pierre Hadot has suggested, philosophical therapeutics is centred on a concern with 
the healing of our own lives so as to return us to the joy of existing,27 then in the texts of 
his middle period Nietzsche can be seen to be an heir to this ancient tradition. If there is 
one crucial component to Nietzsche’s philosophical therapeutics in the texts of his middle 
period that he keeps returning to again and again it is the need for spiritual joyfulness and 
the task of cultivating in ourselves, after centuries of training by morality and religion, 




Only the ennobled human being may be given freedom of spirit; to him alone does 
alleviation of life draw near and salve his wounds; only he may say that he lives 
for the sake of joy (Freudigkeit) and for the sake of no further goal…(WS 350)  
 
 
Epicurus famously writes that the arguments of a philosopher that do not touch on 
the therapeutic treatment of human suffering are empty. The analogy is made with the art 
of medicine: just as the use of this art is to cast out sicknesses of the body, so the use of 
philosophy is to throw out suffering from the soul. It is in the texts of his middle period 
that Nietzsche’s writing comes closest to being an exercise in philosophical therapeutics.  
It endeavours to revitalise for a modern age ancient philosophical concerns, notably a 
teaching for mortal souls who wish to be liberated from the fear and anguish of existence, 
as well as from God, the ‘metaphysical need’,28 and are able to affirm their mortal 
conditions of existence.  As a general point of inspiration one might adopt Hadot’s 
insight into the therapeutic ambitions of ancient philosophy that was, he claims, ‘intended 
to cure mankind’s anguish’ (for example, anguish over our mortality) (Hadot 1995: 265-
6). This is evident in the teaching of Epicurus which sought to demonstrate the mortality 
of the soul and whose aim was, ‘to free humans from “the fears of the mind”’ (Wilson 
2008: 7).29  Similarly, Nietzsche’s teaching in Dawn is for mortal souls (D 501). The 
ultimate aim of this conception of philosophy is to promote joy in living and in one’s own 
self (WS 86). In the middle period, then, Epicurus is an attractive figure for Nietzsche 
because of the emphasis on a modest lifestyle, the attention given to the care of self, and 
also because he conceives philosophy not as a theoretical discourse but one that, first and 
foremost, is a kind of practical activity aimed at the attainment of eudemonia or the 
flourishing life.30  Nietzsche wants free spirits to take pleasure in existence, involving 
taking pleasure in themselves and in friendship. The difference from Epicurus is that he is 
developing a therapy for the sicknesses of the soul under modern conditions of social 
control and discipline.  Dawn 174 makes this clear when, in response to what he sees as 
the tyrannical encroachments of sympathetic morality within commercial society, 
Nietzsche writes of cultivating a self that others can behold with pleasure within a self-
enclosed garden and that also provides a gate of hospitality (D 174). As Michael Ure has 
helpfully shown, in opposition to the desert of undifferentiated atoms offered by modern 
commercial culture Nietzsche provides the image of an oasis and one that depicts neither 
the past glories of Homeric agonism nor the resplendent isolation of the noble 
individual.31 The image Nietzsche comes up with of a self-enclosed garden clearly draws 
on ideas of paradise in the Western tradition (our word paradise etymologically derives 
from the Persian for walled garden, paradeiza), and he provocatively counters the 
Christian idea of a locked gate or porta clausa with that of a hospitable one: ‘To cultivate 
oneself…is to create oneself as a paradise garden for the other’.32  
 Catherine Wilson neatly lays out the central tenets of the Epicurean system in her 
recent study, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity. They include: the denial of 
supernatural agency engaged in the design and maintenance of the world; the view that 
self-moving, subvisible particles acting blindly bring about all growth, change, and 
decline; and the insistence that the goal of ethical self-discipline, which involves 
asceticism, is the minimization of mental and physical suffering.33  There is much here 
that accords with what Nietzsche found appealing in Epicurus.  However, it is also the 
case that Nietzsche’s reception of Epicurus has quite specific features.  For example, he 
shows little interest in the ontological status of atomism and the problems of the theory of 
knowledge and much more interest in Epicurean cosmology, such as its distinction 
between world and universe.  As one commentator has noted, this focus on the world and 
distrust of the idea of the universe, including the idea of the sum of all possible worlds, 
“allowed Nietzsche to collect the themes of Epicurean divinity, blessedness, friendship 
and philosophical regimen around the focus of the ancient science of this world of 
‘meteorology’.”34  As Liba Taub has put it, the Epicurean aim “was to demonstrate that 
the universe and various distant phenomena can be explained without reference to 
anything outside nature, or extraordinary.”35 Informing Epicurean views on cosmology 
and meteorology was the desire to eliminate fear and anxiety, especially about the 
intervention of the gods in the world. Epicurus thus developed a strict materialist 
philosophy that was designed to provide natural explanations of phenomena that were 
often seen as due to the activities of supernatural powers.36 Although acknowledging the 
existence of an infinite number of worlds (cosmoi), Epicurus sought to account for the 
meteōra, such as the phenomenon of the sky and earthquakes, in terms of the natural 
workings of our local cosmos.  Thus, the fundamental Epicurean aims, such as the 
alleviation of anxiety, are at the heart of their cosmological and meteorological 
explanations. In the middle period Nietzsche is inspired by Epicurus’s focus on the 
world, his redemption of nature from human projection and teleology, and his conception 
of philosophy as the art of living in which one lives the philosophical life and does not 
engage merely in theoretical discourses.  
It is not, then, Epicurus the atomist that Nietzsche focuses his attention on, but 
Epicurus the ethicist, that is, the philosopher who teaches a new way of life by remaining 
true to the earth, embracing the fact of human mortality and denying any cosmic 
exceptionalism on the part of the human.   Nietzsche is also greatly inspired by the 
practical dimension of Epicurus’s philosophy.  It is the strength of the Epicurean 
attachment to the world that Nietzsche will capture in his conception of ‘heroic-idyllic 
philosophizing’ in The Wanderer and His Shadow, and it is also encapsulated well by the 
young Marx when he writes that ‘Epicurus is satisfied and blissful in philosophy’;37 that 
‘embodied in him are the serenity of thought satisfied in itself’.38  For Nietzsche, 
Epicurus is to be revered as a thinker in whom wisdom assumes bodily form: there is a 
need to hear the voice of reason and philosophy and to actually see embodied (leibhaft) 
wisdom (MOM 224).    
Let me now turn to examining the resources Nietzsche finds in the teaching and 
that he thinks can be reactivated in his own time.  An overriding aim he has at this time is 
to employ science to temper mental and emotional excess.  The task, as he sees it, is to 
help cool down the human mind.  He writes in 1878: 
 
 
...shouldn’t we, the more spiritual human beings of an age that is visibly catching 
fire in more and more places, have to grasp all available means for quenching and 
cooling, so that we will remain at least as steady, harmless, and moderate as we 
are now, and will thus perhaps become useful at some point in serving this age as 
mirror and self-regulation? – (HH I: 38) 
 
 
Epicurean philosophy can play a key role here. Along with science in general, it serves to 
make us ‘colder and more sceptical,’ helping to cool down ‘the fiery stream of belief in 
ultimate definitive truths,’ a stream that has grown so turbulent through Christianity (HH 
I: 244). For Lucretius ‘there’s no good life, no blessedness, without a mind made 
clear…’39 As Lucretius further writes in De Rerum Natura: 
 
 Our terrors and our darknesses of mind 
Must be dispelled, then, not by sunshine’s rays,  
Not by those shining arrows of light, 
But by insight into nature, and a scheme  
Of systematic contemplation.40 
 
For Nietzsche, the illnesses and neuroses we encounter in humanity require that “ice-
packs” be placed on them (HH I: 38).  
In interpreting Epicureanism as a science that tempers emotional and mental 
excess Nietzsche is, in fact, following a well-established tradition in nineteenth century 
thought that appreciates this point. As Friedrich Albert Lange notes in his History of 
Materialism (1866), a text that deeply impressed the young Nietzsche: ‘The mere 
historical knowledge of natural events, without a knowledge of causes, is valueless; for it 
does not free us from fear nor lift us upon superstition. The more causes of change we 
have discovered, the more we shall attain the calmness of contemplation; and it cannot be 
supposed that this inquiry can be without result upon our happiness’.41 If we can come to 
regard change in things as necessarily inherent in their existence we free ourselves from 
our natural terror at this order of change and evolution.  If we believe in the old myths we 
live in fear of the eternal torments to come; if we are too sensible to believe in these 
torments we may still apprehend the loss of all feeling which comes with death as an evil, 
as if the soul could continue to feel this deprivation.  As every student of philosophy 
knows the event of death for Epicurus is an affair of indifference precisely because it 
deprives us of all feeling. As Lange glosses Epicurus: ‘So long as we are, there is as yet 
no death; but as soon as death comes, then we exist no more’.42   If events can be 
explained in accordance with universal laws, with effects attributable to natural causes, 
an important goal of philosophy can be attained and secured, chiefly liberation from fear 
and anxiety. 
In The Wanderer and his Shadow Nietzsche describes Epicurus as ‘the soul-
soother (Seelen-Beschwichtiger) of later antiquity’ who had the ‘wonderful insight’ that 
to quieten our being it is not necessary to have resolved the ultimate and outermost 
theoretical questions (WS 7). To those who are tormented by the fear of the gods, one 
points out that if the gods exist they do not concern themselves with us and that it is 
unnecessary to engage in ‘fruitless disputation’ over the ultimate question as to whether 
they exist or not. Furthermore, in response to the consideration of a hypothesis, half 
belonging to physics and half to ethics, and that may cast gloom over our spirits, it is 
wise to refrain from refuting the hypothesis and instead offer a rival hypothesis, even a 
multiplicity of hypotheses.  To someone who wishes to offer consolation – for example, 
to the unfortunate, to ill-doers, to hypochondriacs, and so on – one can call to mind two 
pacifying formulae of Epicurus that are capable of being applied to many questions: 
‘firstly, if that is how things are they do not concern us; secondly, things may be thus but 
they may also be otherwise’ (WS 7). 
In her book Therapy of Desire Martha Nussbaum explains well the nature of 
Epicurus’s intervention in a society ‘that values money and luxury above the health of the 
soul’, and in which ‘every enterprise is poisoned by the fear of death, a fear that will not 
let any of its members taste any stable joy, but turns them into the grovelling slaves of 
corrupt religious teachers’.43 As Lucretius has it:  
 
 …fear of death 
 Induces hate of life and light, and men 
 Are so depressed that they destroy themselves 
 Having forgotten that this very fear 
 Was the first cause and source of all their woe.44  
 
In his middle period Nietzsche picks up the Epicurean doctrine on death and puts it to 
critical effect. For Nietzsche our religions and moralities do not wed us to the earth as a 
site of dwelling and thinking; rather, we consider ourselves ‘too good and too significant 
for the earth’, as if we were paying it only a passing visit (D 425). Several aphorisms in 
Dawn consider humanity’s misguided dream of an immortal existence.  Dawn 211 is an 
especially witty aphorism in which Nietzsche considers the impertinence of the dream.  
He notes that the actual existence of a single immortal human being would be enough to 
drive everyone else on earth into a rampage of death and suicide out of being sick and 
tired of it.  He adds:   
 
 
And you earth inhabitants with your mini-notions of a few thousand mini-minutes 
of time want to be an eternal nuisance to eternal, universal existence! Is there 
anything more impertinent! (D 211) 
 
 
Nietzsche champions Epicurus as a figure who has sought to show mankind how it can 
conquer its fears of death. Identifying the goal of a good life with the removal of mental 
and physical pain Epicureans place, ‘the eradication of the fears of death at the very heart 
of their ethical project’.45  As a ‘therapy of anguish’ Epicureanism is a philosophy that 
aims to procure peace of mind, and an essential task here is to liberate the mind from its 
irrational fear of death. It seeks to do this by showing that the soul does not survive the 
body and that death is not and cannot be an event within life.  Central to Epicurus’s 
counsel, then, is the thought that we need to accustom ourselves to believing that death is 
nothing to us; our longing for immortality needs to be removed: ‘…there is nothing 
fearful in life for one who has grasped that there is nothing fearful in the absence of 
life.’46 What appears to be the most frightening of bad things should be nothing to us, 
“since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not 
exist.”47 The wise human being ‘neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not 
offend him, nor does he believe not living to be something bad.’48  If, as Epicurus 
supposes, everything good and bad consists in sense-experience, then death is simply the 
privation of sense-experience.  The goal of philosophical training, then, is freedom from 
disturbance and anxiety in which we reach a state of ataraxia or psychic tranquillity: the 
body is free from pain and the soul is liberated from distress.   
In Dawn Epicurus is portrayed as the enemy of the idea of punishments in Hell 
after death, which was developed by numerous secret cults of in the Roman Empire and 
was taken up by Christianity.  For Nietzsche the triumph of Epicurus’s teaching resounds 
most beautifully in the mouth of the sombre Roman Lucretius but comes too early. 
Christianity takes the belief in ‘subterranean terrors’ under its special protection and this 
foray into heathendom enables it to carry the day over the popularity of the Mithras and 
Isis cults, winning to its side the rank of the timorous as the most zealous adherents of the 
new faith (Nietzsche notes that because of the extent of the Jews’ attachment to life such 
an idea fell on barren ground).  However, the teaching of Epicurus triumphs anew in the 
guise of modern science that has rejected ‘any other representation of death and any life 
beyond it’ (D 72). Nietzsche, then, is keen to encourage human beings to cultivate an 
attitude towards existence in which they accept their mortality and attain a new serenity 
about their dwelling on the earth, to conquer unjustified fears, and to reinstitute the role 
played by chance and chance events in the world and in human existence.49 As Hadot 
notes, for the Epicurean sage the world is the product of chance, not divine intervention, 
and this brings with it pleasure and peace of mind, freeing him from an unreasonable fear 
of the gods and allowing him to consider each moment as an unexpected miracle.50  
Although Nietzsche himself confessed to having no fear of death, he is keen for 
his readers to embrace the mortal conditions of their existence. In doing so we give 
ourselves back the time that the longing for immortality deprives us of and we become 
free to experiment with our lives, both individually and socially.  In Dawn 501, which is 
entitled “Mortal Souls,” Nietzsche writes that, ‘So far as the promotion of knowledge is 
concerned, humankind’s most useful achievement is perhaps the abandonment of its 
belief in an immortal soul’ (D 501).  ‘You should read Lucretius,’ Nietzsche advises 
further in The Anti-Christian, ‘to see what Epicurus had fought, not paganism but 
Christianity,’ by which he means, he tells us, the corruption of the soul through ideas of 
guilt, punishment, and immortality. This takes the form of Epicurus’s battle against 
subterranean cults and latent Christianity. Nietzsche further suggests that Epicurus would 
have won this battle if Paul had not come on the scene (A 58).   
Nietzsche finds in Epicurus, then, a victory over pessimism in which death 
becomes the last celebration of a life that is constantly embellished.51 This last of the 
Greek philosophers teaches the joy of living in the midst of a world in decay and where 
all moral doctrines preach suffering.  As Richard Roos puts it, ‘The example of Epicurus 
teaches that a life filled with pain and renunciation prepares one to savour the little joys 
of the everyday better. Relinquishing Dionysian intoxication, Nietzsche becomes a 
student of this master of moderate pleasures and careful dosages’.52  In Epicurus 
Nietzsche discovers what Roos calls aptly an ‘irresistible power’ and a rare strength of 
spirit, and quotes Nietzsche from 1880: ‘I found strength in the very places one does not 
look for it, in simple, gentle and helpful men…powerful natures dominate, that is a 
necessity, even if those men do not move one finger. And they bury themselves, in their 
lifetime, in a pavilion in their garden’ (KSA 9, 6 [206]).53  
 
 Deleuze and Epicurean Naturalism 
Deleuze is an instructive reader of Epicurean naturalism: he shows how the physics and 
the ethics intersect, and this is what I wish to now focus my attention on.  Deleuze weds 
naturalism to a novel reworking of ethics and centred on the tasks or labours of the art of 
life.  His interpretations of Epicurean and Spinozist naturalisms are propelled by an 
ethical motivation.  Deleuze, as I read him, is primarily a practical philosopher keenly 
interested in the ethical art of life, where it is a ‘manner of living’ or a style of life.  His 
naturalism fuses together in an instructive way the philosophy of nature and the 
philosophy of life, and where ‘life’ is not simply an idea or a matter of theory but centres 
on, and concerns, a way of being.  If philosophy has a use it is to be found in the doctrine 
of the Epicureans, as well as in later thinkers such as Spinoza and Nietzsche, namely, the 
creation of the free human being and an empirical education in the art of life.  The object 
of naturalism, and in terms of both its speculative and practical aspects, is to distinguish 
in the case of human beings what belongs to nature and what belongs to myth.  This is 
why for Deleuze the first philosopher is a naturalist, simply because he speaks of nature 
rather than the gods.  Deleuze follows Epicureanism and Spinozism in holding ethics to 
be central to philosophical inquiry and activity: we don’t simply study nature as end in 
itself but as a way of better understanding how we can promote a flourishing life.  Our 
being in the world is not to be guided by myths and illusions, especially of a supernatural 
kind, but rather by the affirmation of the positive power of an immanent and multiple 
nature and by the joy that results from recognising the diversity of its elements.  
Deleuze is, then, first and foremost, an ethically motivated naturalist: he attaches 
himself to naturalism because he sees it as a project of demystification and human 
emancipation. The task is to liberate human beings from the realm of myth: the myth of 
religion, the myth of a false physics, and the myths of a false philosophy.  This 
naturalism consists in the critique of superstition since it is this that cuts us off from our 
power of action and diminishes it, and induces in us sadness:  naturalism exists, says 
Deleuze, to defeat this sadness.54 The new naturalism Deleuze espouses has its anchor in 
his readings of Leibniz and Spinoza.  However, in order to fully appreciate its ethical 
import it is equally necessary to understand some key aspects of his reading of Epicurean 
naturalism, and to this I now turn.  
For Deleuze, Lucretius follows Epicurus by effecting a double determination in 
which naturalism is made the speculative and the practical object of philosophy.  Deleuze 
writes: ‘From Lucretius to Nietzsche, the same end is pursued and attained. Naturalism 
makes of thought and sensibility an affirmation’.55 This passage is a clear indication that 
Deleuze is wedded to naturalism as a theoretical and practical program.  In a declaration 
that seems indicative of his lifelong commitment to pluralism and multiplicity, he argues 
that nature is not collective but distributive, not attributive but conjunctive: it proceeds 
not through being (the ‘is’) but through becoming (the ‘and’).   In the worlds of nature we 
observe ‘alternations and entwinings, resemblances and differences, attractions and 
distractions, nuance and abruptness’.  Nature, then, whilst not a whole can be conceived 
as a sum, and we can capture this in the image of the Harlequin’s cloak, ‘made entirely’, 
Deleuze says, ‘of solid patches and empty spaces, she is made of plenitude and void, 
beings and nonbeings’.56  
In Lucretius we encounter a novel philosophy of nature, one that resists the 
seduction and temptations of the false kind of philosophy, namely, the theological form 
with its desire for fatum (providential meaning or the meaning of the whole and of the 
goal or end). How is this naturalism, in its essence, to be conceived?  For Deleuze, it 
requires a highly structured principle of causality to account for the production of the 
diverse since there are only different and non-totalizable composition and combinations 
of the elements of nature.  It is the nature of the atom that needs to be clarified first, and 
this is what Deleuze focuses his attention on.  It is the atom that challenges our sense 
perception and our consciousness.  Deleuze begins with a surprisingly simple 
proposition:  the atom is that which can only be thought and it is to thought what a 
sensible object is to the senses. Moreover, the atom is what gives food for thought:  as we 
cannot perceive the atom we have to think its nature or character, and to do so rigorously 
and precisely.  The atom is imperceptible not because of some deficiency in our senses 
but on account of its own character.  Deleuze identifies an ‘Epicurean method’ of 
epistemology by which we may come to know something of the atom, and this method 
proceeds by analogy and by passage or transition.  First, we draw the analogy between 
the sensible object, which we endow with (sensible) parts, and the noetic object that is 
also endowed with parts, and we posit in this act a minimum thought that represents the 
smallest part of the object just as in the instance of sensibility there is a minimum 
sensible that represents the smallest part of the object.  Second, guided or steered by this 
analogy between the sensible object and the noetic object, we move from the sensible to 
thought and in reverse by means of a series of transitions.  
Deleuze now advances several key theses on the nature of what is, the nature of 
the atoms.  In the first one he states some key aspects of the atoms and the void, such as 
that the sum of atoms is infinite and precisely because they do not combine or synthesize 
to form a totality.  This is followed up in points 5-7 on the shapes, sizes, and possible 
configurations of atoms. However, it is the third point that is clearly the decisive insight 
for Deleuze, and this concerns the clinamen or swerve.  When atoms collide, as they do, 
they do so not account of their different weights but due to the clinamen and it is this 
‘differential of matter’ that relates atoms to one another.57  This is Deleuze’s main claim 
and insight, and it removes him from a prevailing reading of Lucretius: ‘The clinamen or 
swerve has nothing to do with an oblique movement which would come accidentally to 
modify a vertical fall’.58  On Deleuze’s reading it is an error to construe the clinamen as 
something haphazard and capricious.  On the contrary, for Deleuze it is not at all 
accidental but always there, and he likens it to the conatus, speaking of it as a differential 
of matter.59 Thus, for Deleuze, we go astray when we conceive the clinamen as a 
secondary movement since there is only an originary movement and this movement is 
characteristic of matter.  The causality of the clinamen is, therefore, more ‘unassignable’ 
(incertus, or uncertain) than it is ‘indeterminate’, and this is because it takes place at such 
a velocity that we have to think it in terms of a time smaller than what can be thought in a 
minimum of continuous time.  It is this set of insights that leads to Deleuze to an 
important conclusion regarding the lex atomi, chiefly, that there is an irreducible plurality 
of causes and in any causal series a whole is not brought together. This means that nature 
cannot be totalized, and it is on account of this that causes are said to be ‘unassignable’. 
The structured principle of causality Deleuze is after works, as Brooke Holmes helpfully 
puts it, ‘inside the various compositions and combinations that populate the cosmos.  As a 
result, diversity emerges within a world that is also characterized by pattern and 
resemblance’.60  In point 7 Deleuze arrives at the conclusion that difference is primary, 
which means that in the philosophy of nature we find ‘the heterogeneity of the diverse 
with itself, and also the resemblance of the diverse with itself’.61  Worlds and bodies 
have their similarities in time and space. Deleuze insists, however, that resemblance 
proceeds from the diverse and is implicated in diversity.  
The next move Deleuze makes in his essay is of crucial importance for it centres 
on how we make the move from physics to ethics, including the motivation for doing so.   
As every student of Epicurean teaching knows such a move is its most fundamental 
aspect.   The task of physics – to be thought in terms of naturalism – is to determine what 
is really infinite from what isn’t and to demarcate the difference between the true infinite 
from its false form or appearance.  The true infinite, according to Deleuze, consists in the 
sum of atoms, the void, the number of atoms of the same shape and size, and the number 
of combination of atoms and of worlds similar, or different, to ours.  What is not infinite 
are the parts of the atom and the body, the sizes and shapes of atoms, and every worldly 
or intra-worldly combination.  This determination of the nature of the infinite is said to be 
‘apodeictic’; and yet the real task is to show why this determination is the necessary 
means of ethics and practice.  Let me turn to this topic.  
Epicurean ethical practice suggests to us ways of supressing or conquering pain.  
However, as Deleuze correctly notes, our attainment of real pleasure, including a sense of 
being in the world in a joyful manner, has much more powerful obstacles to confront, 
such as phantoms, superstitions, terrors of existence, and the fear of death.  For Lucretius, 
the object of philosophy is the cultivation of health and he speaks of philosophy as a form 
of treatment that can be administered (De Rerum Natura IV: 22); it is a therapeutics, one 
that has specific illnesses and afflictions to cure, notably the fear of the active gods and 
the fear of death as well as the whole realm of superstition. Lucretius thinks that his 
Roman brethren suffer from what he calls the dead weight of superstition and are haunted 
by the fear of eternal punishments after death.  A thoroughgoing and clear-sighted 
program of naturalism is needed in order to emancipate the mind from subjection to fear 
and superstition. Several occasions in the book Lucretius provides the following lines as a 
refrain of learning:   
 
 
The dread and darkness of the mind cannot be dispelled by the sunbeams, the 
shining shafts of day, but only by an understanding of the outward forms and 
inner workings of nature (II: 59-62; see also III: 91-94).   
 
Lucretius offers a naturalist program of philosophy that amounts to a project of 
demystification and hence liberation. His is a philosophy of immanence: nature is a self-
producing positive power, eternally self-creating and self-destroying; the elements 
postulated at the base of nature work bottom up, in which the diverse products of nature 
are generated rather than assumed as already given.62 The immanence at work is a radical 
one for it means that no ‘divine power’ has created the universe (II: 181) and there is no 
‘divine plan’ (V: 81). With its scientific principles of nothing springing from nothing and 
nothing ever being destroyed Lucretius’s philosophy of nature rids philosophy of 
supernatural explanations.  Nothing springs from nothing since for anything to be created 
there is required specific germs, a set of conditions, and time.  The teaching has radical 
aspects:  for example, the soul is nothing more than matter and is subject to death since it 
is made of subtle atoms scattered throughout the body, and is therefore as material as the 
body and without which it cannot exist.  Death is radical in its finality and Lucretius is 
uncompromising in his account of this: it denotes the end of our existence and yet is not 
to be feared for the reasons that Epicurus has provided and that Lucretius rehearses in 
dramatic fashion in the denouement to book three of the text.  Lucretius speaks at the 
very close of book three of the lust for life as ‘deplorable’ since it ‘holds us trembling in 
bondages to uncertainties and dangers’, with the ‘unquenchable thirst for life keeping us 
always on the gasp’ (III: 1084-5). 
The humanity that Lucretius depicts in the book is indeed a melancholy one (the 
melancholy is well captured in Bergson’s appreciation of Lucretius from 1884).63  As 
Deleuze notes, the plague, so graphically depicted in the denouement to De Rerum 
Natura, not only inflicts pain and suffering but equally disturbs the soul. The disturbance 
of the soul has two main elements: first, the illusion that arises from our spurious idea 
that the body has an infinite capacity for pleasure; and, second, the illusion that the soul 
endures forever and that gives rise, once it has taken root in the mind, to the notion of an 
infinity of possible sufferings and torments after death.  We can even see a link between 
the two illusions since the fear of an infinite suffering and punishment is but the natural 
price to be paid for having desires without limit.  Here the life of the fool becomes a hell 
on earth, as the poem so instructively depicts.  For Lucretius, as for Spinoza after him, the 
religious person displays a curious complex of avidity and anguish, and of covetousness 
and culpability.  We live in fear of dying when we are not dead and the fear of not 
actually being dead once in fact we are.   
Deleuze will then explain the operations of the mind in terms of how bodies or 
atomic compounds emit subtle and fluid elements, and they emanate either from the 
depths of bodies (such as sounds, smells, and tastes) or as detachments from the surface 
of things, including the simulacra (such as forms and colours).  I will not follow 
Deleuze’s instructive treatment of this.  What is key is Deleuze’s account of a third 
species of simulacra, which emanates neither from the depths of bodies nor the surface of 
things, and that he calls ‘phantasms’.  These are images that enjoy a high degree of 
independence and assume a life of their own, and they can be theological, oneiric, and 
erotic.  We develop images that take the place of actual objects, from giants to ghosts.  
This happens for instance when the mind becomes isolated from the external world and 
when the body lies dormant, as in sleep.  In the case of the erotic, although there is an 
actual love object, it can be neither possessed nor absorbed, and so the mind 
contemplating such an object is prone to all kinds of fantasies, including ones motivated 
by jealousy.   
The ethical task is, with the aid of naturalism, to dispel the illusions of the mind 
and that generate fears, torments, and superstitions.  It is in this sense for Deleuze, and 
this sense only, that physics is made subordinate to ethics: the task is not simply to limit 
knowledge or prevent its development, as is often said of Epicurean teaching, but rather 
to demonstrate the range of its practical application.64  Deleuze writes, then: 
 
 
The speculative object and the practical object of philosophy as Naturalism, 
science and pleasure, coincide on this point: it is always a matter of denouncing 
the illusion, the false infinite, the infinity of religion and all the theological-erotic-
oneiric myths in which it is expressed.65  
 
 If philosophy has a use it is to be found in the doctrine of the Epicureans, as well as in 
later thinkers such as Spinoza and Nietzsche, namely, the creation of the free human 
being.  This freedom consists, at least as an initial task, in freeing oneself from the realm 
of illusions produced by the image of the false infinite. The object of naturalism, and in 
terms of both its speculative and practical aspects, now comes clearly into view: it is to 
distinguish in the case of human beings what belongs to nature and what belongs to myth.  
This is why for Deleuze the first philosopher is a naturalist, simply because he speaks of 
nature rather than the gods. Humanity has suffered from three main forms of myth in its 
history: the myth of religion (the active gods); the myth of a false physics (that 
humankind is destined to a particular fate); and the myths of false philosophy under the 
influence of theology (Being, the One, and the Whole). The critical task here is not to 
introduce new myths since these would only serve to deprive nature of its positivity.  
Lucretius carries the ‘enterprise of “demystification”’ to its limit.66  In addition, Deleuze 
thinks there is a ‘constant’ of naturalism and evident in its history from Lucretius to 
Spinoza and Nietzsche: this constant consists in the denunciation of sadness, in particular 
denouncing everything that has sadness as the basis of its power, such as the rule of 
priests and political tyranny.  For Lucretius, then, a fundamental reformation of the 
human mind and its attachment to life is required, and this is the task he reserves for 
philosophy.   
Knowledge serves to show us that we count for practically nothing in the universe 
since we are but a fortuitous combination of elements that decays just like everything else 
alive.  Having stated this, though, we know that for Lucretius there is a deep joy to be had 
from this naturalism: this is the elevated joy of the sage who imbued with great truth 
calmly awaits a death that will reduce him to nothingness: he possesses supreme 
knowledge and yet at the same time savours the sweetest joys that a human being is 





Deleuze’s reading of Lucretius can complement Nietzsche’s appraisal of the Epicurean 
system by showing how physics and ethics intersect in it. At the same time Nietzsche is 
able to fill in the gaps in Deleuze’s reading of Epicureanism by providing us with a rich 
set of insights into the kinds of pleasure and joy at work in the Epicurean way of life. I 
appreciate, however, that when it comes to Epicureanism and its legacy the late Nietzsche 
presents a more complex case than I have depicted in this essay.  In his late writings 
Epicurus is still celebrated for waging war against the superstitions of religion but is also 
said to be a decadent – indeed a ‘typical’ one (AC 30, 58) – along with many other 
philosophical and artistic figures from Socrates to Schopenhauer, and Wagner.  We also 
get the fundamental contrast between ‘Epicurean delight’ and ‘Dionysian joy’ (KSA 11, 
25 [95]).  However, although the late Nietzsche has legitimate worries over the dangers 
of the cultivation of beatitude as a way of life, whether this takes an Epicurean or 
Spinozist form – dangers of dwarfing and of relaxation - his later depiction of Epicurus as 
a decadent arguably conceals just what he found so productive about the naturalism of 
Epicureanism in his middle period.   This is, in essence, a project of cooling down a 
human mind that is prone to neurosis and that prevents the enjoyment of mortal pleasures 
and the delights of the earth.   
It is worth stressing, though, that even in his middle period texts Nietzsche has a 
complex picture of both Epicurus and of the search for happiness or joy.  In GS 45, 
simply entitled ‘Epicurus’, the Greek sage is depicted as someone whose happiness 
emerges from continual suffering.  The scene Nietzsche depicts in the aphorism is one of 
Epicurean illumination or enlightenment: Epicurus is not estranged from nature and 
recognizes his kinship with animals and the elements of nature.  Rather than deploying 
his contemplation of the sea to bolster his own ego (thinking of his own safety or taking 
pride in fearlessness), Epicurus abandons his sense of self altogether so that he can open 
himself up to the sea of existence, and perhaps here we find an alternative to Dionysian 
ecstasy, entailing a more peaceful and less grandiose loss of the self into the Ur-Eine.  
Unlike Christ, Epicurus does not walk on the water but floats serenely on the sea, buoyed 
up by it and even cradled by it, happy with the gifts life has to offer, and existing beyond 
fear and anxiety even though he is opening himself up to troubling realities, such as the 
approach of death and his personal extinction.  For Nietzsche, Epicurus is a figure who 
has liberated himself from the fear and anxiety of existence, and is capable of spiritual 
joyfulness that consists, in part, in the serene contemplation of the beauty and sublimity 
of things and a cultivation of simple, modest pleasures.  Epicurus is a figure who was 
“true to the earth,” abandoning all hubristic conceptions of human significance, including 
exceptionalism, and who taught that one should die as if one had never lived.  As 
Nietzsche astutely noted, never in the history of thought has such a voluptuous 
appreciation of existence been so modest.   
Nietzsche is not in favour of a radical cure in response to our complex affective 
conditions of existence – for example, the cure of a Stoic extirpation of the passions – 
since the result is ‘petrifaction’ (GS 306).  One needs to have passions in life and a 
passionate engagement with, and attachment to, it, and so Nietzsche favours, contra the 
‘hard Stoic hedgehog skin’, the ‘subtle irritability’ of the Epicurean:  the Epicurean, we 
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